LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

 

From the New Deal through the Cold War, liberalism dominated American political thought and public policy.  From Franklin Roosevelt to Lyndon Johnson, the American people looked to the federal government to assist those among, who through no fault of their own could not help themselves. Unfortunately, for a variety of internal and external reasons liberalism declined in the latter decades of the last century. Unrest, protest, and other manifestations of civil disturbances, caused widespread disillusionment and resentment among the middle class, the consensus or vital center, which had determined public policy in America for decades.

By the late 1960’s a conservative backlash had emerged, exploiting the disenchantment and anger among the middle class Americans and parlaying such disenfranchisement into political victory. Conservatives such as Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, and ultimately George Bush, came to power by uniting the alienated middle class across the regions but finding a solid support base among white Southerners. George W. Bush’s 2000 victory over Al Gore represented the final triumph of conservatism over New Deal/Great Society liberalism. Conservatives shattered FDR’s original coalition of labor, minorities, and intellectuals. Also contributing to liberalism’s demise was the end of the Cold War and perhaps most important, the Vietnam war, which engendered on a variety of levels, widespread public disaffection. Moreover, many Great Society programs led to uncontrollable ‘rising expectations’ by radicalizing and politicizing the poor, which only further alienated an already disturbed middle class. Ronald Reagan’s victories in 1980 and 1984, represented the final disintegration of the New Deal coalition.

           Johnson wanted to create a theme for his administration separate and distinct from other presidents.  “Johnson sought to… convey to the American people that this president, more than any other in history, was going to make the United States a truly ‘Great Society.'” (Moretta 283)  For almost twenty years, the Cold War had conditioned Americans to rely on the central government to solve their most serious problems, and nearly twenty years of comparatively consistent success in the Cold War had disposed Americans to trust that their government could accomplish what it set out to do.  
Johnson, basing his action on FDR’s postwar liberalism, wanted to “go beyond the achievements of FDR to create an American worthy of emulation and leadership in the twenty-first century.” (Moretta 283) Johnson was committed to ‘Education for all our children,’ ‘jobs for all who seek them,’ ‘care for our elderly,’ and above all, ‘equal rights for all Americans whatever their race or color.’  Johnson saw himself as the ‘messiah of the masses.’  He was driven to surpass FDR by taking New Deal liberalism further, in an attempt to eradicate poverty in America. 

            While Johnson’s Great Society was full of potential, it failed to successfully help the disadvantaged while maintaining support from the Middle Class.  One of the first signs of the coming problems of the Great Society happened only five days after Johnson signed the 1965 Voting Rights Act.  “On August 11, rioting broke out (largely as a result of endemic police brutality and pent-up rage among the black male population of which three-forth were unemployed) in the Los Angles black ghetto of Watts” which resulted in thirty-four deaths, 1,000 injured, 4,000 arrested, and damages in the amount of $35 million dollars. (Moretta 283) The rioting struck a collective nerve which began to fray the collated consensus and public support for continued LBJ’s social welfare policies. Regardless of the particular cause of the violence, it negatively impacted the image of LBJ’s war on poverty which was seen as a policy that unfairly favored blacks at the expense of the white middle class.  As “one domestic crisis after another ensued over the course of the next two years” the middle class grew growingly resentful of the Great Society legislation and diminished the moral commitment to such issues as civil right and eradicating poverty. (Moretta 283) As discontent grew, Johnson slowly began to lose the support of the vital center. 

            Johnson’s programs were flawed from the start.  It relayed on the idea that the poor were poor because “they lacked the opportunity and, thus, impoverished individuals must be given access to opportunity so they could be motivated to climb out of the poverty cycle.” (Moretta 297) Community Action Programs, which was the war on poverty’s most important initiative, operated on this idea and doomed Johnson’s consensus in which he built his office.  CAP attempted to increase participation of residents of poverty in their local communities.  This led to the radicalization of the poor; the poor took seriously that they would be empowered and lifted out of poverty by the federal government.  “Almost immediately the CAP program backfired creating the very intergroup conflict Johnson hoped to avoid.  Neither Johnson nor the majority of his policy planners believed the poor would take ‘maximum feasible participation’ seriously.” (Moretta 298)

    It was taken seriously by the nation’s poor, fostering a divide between CAP leaders and city officials.  CAPs put the poor people in control of antipoverty agencies.  Chicago Mayor Richard Daley stated it was “like telling the fellow who cleans up [at the newspaper] to be the city editor.” (Moretta 299) It forced Johnson to choose between the community leaders and poor-rights activist which caused the poor to fell betrayed by Johnson himself and reinforced the idea that war over poverty was a farce. The program empowered the poor but breed dependency, where the poor felt they were entitled to success via governmental action.  Johnson’s liberalism had put him in a power struggle with the same people who he was trying to help.  Neither side could win, but Johnson was sure to lose the support of his popular consensus.  The base that had made liberalism the dominate ideology of decades past was fracturing.  “The story of the war on poverty thus became a vignette of the problems – social as well as personal – that ultimately destroyed Johnson’s presidency.” (Moretta 300)
            “And then there was Vietnam.” (Moretta 300)